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Abstract
In eight states, a ”nesting rule” requires that each state Senate district be exactly
composed of two adjacent state House districts. In this paper we investigate the
potential impacts of these nesting rules with a focus on Alaska, where Republicans
have a 2/3 majority in the Senate while a Democratic-led coalition controls the House.
Treating the current House plan as fixed and considering all possible pairings, we find
that the choice of pairings alone can create a swing of 4-5 seats out of 20 against recent
voting patterns, which is similar to the range observed when using a Markov chain
procedure to generate plans without the nesting constraint. The analysis enables
other insights into Alaska districting, including the partisan latitude available to
districters with and without strong rules about nesting and contiguity.
Keywords: Redistricting, Gerrymandering, Markov Chains, Nesting
∗Author order is alphabetical. The authors acknowledge the Prof. Amar G. Bose Research Grant at MIT
and the Jonathan M. Tisch College of Civic Life at Tufts University for ongoing support. MD is partially
supported by NSF DMS-1255442. SG is partially supported by NSF DGE-1650441. SG thanks David
P. Williamson and Kenrick Bjelland for helpful discussions. We thank Coly Elhai, Mallory Harris, Claire
Kelling, Samir Khan, and Jack Snoeyink for substantial joint work and conversations on other approaches
to modeling Alaska redistricting, and particularly acknowledge Samir Khan for his initial implementation
of prune-and-choose. Hakeem Angulu, Ruth Buck, and Max Hully provided excellent data and technical
support. Finally, we thank Anchorage Assemblyman Forrest Dunbar for bringing this problem to our
attention.
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
12
73
2v
1 
 [c
s.S
I] 
 26
 M
ay
 20
20
1 Introduction: Nesting
A great deal of recent attention has been given to the problem of detecting gerrymander-
ing using mathematical and statistical tools. Much of this work has been restricted to
gerrymandering in its classical form: the manipulation of district boundaries to favor one
party or another. However, some states’ rules of redistricting create other opportunities
to extract partisan advantage from control of the process. For example, many states fa-
vor plans that keep counties and cities intact rather than splitting them between districts;
Iowa even requires that congressional plans keep all of its counties intact within districts.
Some observers worry about whether such seemingly neutral rules would turn out to have
partisan or racial consequences for representation. (See, for instance, [12]). In this paper,
we will focus on a class of redistricting principles called nesting rules, which require or
encourage that state-level Senate districts be composed of pairs of neighboring State House
or Assembly districts.
Our present case study is the state of Alaska, where 40 House districts are paired into
20 Senate districts. We start by focusing on the scenario in which House districts are fixed
first, then subsequently paired into Senate districts. We select two recent elections to get a
baseline of partisan preference at the precinct level, then compare the current Senate plan
to all others that can be formed from the current House districts by pairing. Across all
these scenarios, we will discuss when and why the choice of pairing, or perfect matching,
can have a sizeable impact on electoral outcomes.
1.1 Perfect matching interpretation
There are eight states that currently have two single-member House/Assembly districts
nested in each Senate district. In six of those (AL, IL, MN, MT, OR, WY), nesting is
required by State Constitution or statute, and in the remaining two (IA, NV), there are
provisions explaining possible exemptions. There are an additional two states (OH, WI)
that require nesting of three single-member House districts within each Senate district.1
Additionally, California, Hawaii, and New York call for nesting “if possible.”
1The article of the Ohio constitution with this requirement was in effect in 2011 but has now been
repealed, effective 2021.
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Alaska 40 House → 20 Sen Illinois 118 House → 59 Sen
Iowa 100 House → 50 Sen Minnesota 134 House → 67 Sen
Montana 100 House → 50 Sen Nevada 42 House → 21 Sen
Oregon 60 House → 30 Sen Wyoming 60 House → 30 Sen
Ohio 99 House → 33 Sen Wisconsin 99 House → 33 Sen
From the perspective of election administration, nesting is convenient because it re-
duces the number of different ballot styles needed. From the perspective of redistricting,
nesting means that the composition of one house of the legislature massively constrains
the space of possible districting plans for the other, arguably cutting down the latitude for
gerrymandering.
When nesting is mandated, procedures can still vary. According to the Brennan Center’s
Citizen’s Guide to Redistricting [22]: “Sometimes, a nested redistricting plan is created
by drawing Senate districts first, and dividing them in half to form Assembly districts;
sometimes the Assembly districts are drawn first, and clumped together to form Senate
districts.” This paper will focus on the second case: matching, rather than splitting.
Proof of concept
We begin by constructing a toy example to illustrate that matchings matter. Consider
the map shown in Figure 1, where each square cell represents a voter. The 56 voters are
grouped into eight equally-sized, contiguous House districts, each of which is indicated by
a different color. Geographically adjacent House districts (those overlapping on an edge)
are to be paired to form four Senate districts. It is convenient to represent the geographic
relationship of the districts with a dual graph: each node (or vertex) corresponds to a
single district, and two nodes are connected by an edge if the corresponding districts are
geographically adjacent. Pairing these House districts into four Senate districts corresponds
to choosing a perfect matching in the graph: a set of four edges that, together, cover each
of the eight nodes exactly once. (See Figure 2.)
There are exactly eight perfect matchings of this graph; in other words, given these
House districts, there are only 8 ways to form four Senate districts while respecting nesting.
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Figure 1: At left, an illustrative map of 56 voters in eight equally-sized House districts to be
paired into four Senate districts. At right, the dual graph that encodes districts adjacency.
By contrast, there are 2,332,394,150 ways to create four (contiguous, equal-size) Senate
districts from these 56 units without that restriction.2 If we name the colors White, Blue,
Red, Orange, Yellow, Magenta, Cyan, and Violet, we can represent the matchings in the
table below.
Matching Results # D Matching Results # D
WB/RC/OY/MV D/R/R/R 1 WO/BY/RC/VM D/D/R/R 2
WB/RO/YM/CV D/R/R/D 2 WO/BY/RV/CM D/D/R/D 3
WB/RV/CM/OY D/R/D/R 2 WR/BO/YM/CV D/D/R/D 3
WB/RC/OV/MY D/R/D/R 2 WR/BY/OV/CM D/D/D/D 4
Figure 2: The districts can be matched the eight different ways listed here, leading to the
Democratic party getting anywhere from 25% to 100% of the Senate seats. The two perfect
matchings corresponding to the extreme outcomes are shown here.
In this toy example, we discover that the choice of matching can swing the outcome for
Democrats from 1 seat to 4 seats out of four. Below, we carry out a similar analysis on
real-world data.
2This is the number of partitions of a 7× 8 grid graph into four contiguous “districts” of 14 nodes each.
See mggg.org/table.html for a discussion of enumeration patterns for districting problems on grids, and
a link to enumeration code.
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1.2 Mathematical literature on perfect matchings
In our motivating example, we considered the Senate outcomes for every possible perfect
matching in a small graph. Enumerating all perfect matchings in a given graph is a classical
problem in the mathematical field of combinatorics; it has captured significant attention
because it is at once quite elementary and extremely difficult to compute for arbitrary
graphs [36]. The matching problem is also of great interest to physicists studying dimer
coverings (domino tilings) of lattices, which are used to estimate thermodynamic behavior
of liquids [20]. In 1961, three statistical physicists, Temperley, Fisher, and Kasteleyn,
independently and nearly simultaneously derived the formula for the number of perfect
matchings of an m × n grid [18, 34] and subsequently proposed the FKT algorithm for
efficiently computing the number of perfect matchings of any planar graph (that is, in any
graph that can be drawn in the plane without edges crossing). The algorithm is discussed in
more detail in Appendix B in the supplement. For surveys on the mathematics of matching,
see [24] and Volume A of [31].3
1.3 Paper outline
The central research question here is to quantify the partisan advantage available to an
agent who is empowered only to select a House-to-Senate pairing. In Alaska, where there
are only 40 House districts which are patterned in a not very dense manner, it might seem
that there is only limited advantage to be gained. However, we will demonstrate that the
choice of pairings alone can create a swing of 4-5 seats out of 20 against recent voting
patterns. In fact, we will see that even though pairings give a far simpler model of how to
create Senate districts, they give just as much partisan latitude as making Senate districts
from scratch.
We begin by reviewing pertinent background on Alaska politics, demographics, and
redistricting rules in §2, culminating in the selection of two recent elections—the Governor
3This problem is also intimately related to a second enumeration problem, that of counting the spanning
trees of a graph. The number of spanning trees is sometimes called the complexity of a graph. Temperley
defined a transformation that starts with a graph and creates a new associated graph called its T -graph. A
series of remarkable theorems tell us that if G is the T -graph associated to G, then the number of spanning
trees of G is exactly equal to the number of perfect matchings of G [9, 19, 21, 33].
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and U.S. House races of 2018—to serve as our electoral baselines for the remainder of the
analysis. In §3, we begin by describing the construction of dual graphs that model the
adjacencies of geographical units– in this case, House districts. Next, we overview the
algorithmic approaches we apply to those graphs in the rest of the paper. These methods
include enumerating matchings with a classic algorithm called FKT, constructing sets of
matchings with a depth-first algorithm we call prune-and-choose described in Appendix C,
and finally varying the underlying districts with a Markov chain. The proof of validity for
prune-and-choose is found in Appendix C.2.
In the remainder of the paper, we report on the results of these algorithmic investi-
gations for Alaska. Beyond the flexibility inherent in choosing the nesting, we find that
the interpretation of redistricting rules (in particular, geographic adjacency when regions
are connected by water) has a substantial impact on the number of matchings. With the
current House districts fixed, §4 measures the partisan tilt of the pairing itself among the
full set of matchings. Finally, in §5, we vary the House and Senate districts themselves
by randomly assembling them from precinct building blocks with a method that provides
heuristic assurances of representative sampling. By exploring the space of valid plans, and
evaluate expected partisan properties and matchability of alternative plans.
In Appendix D we extend this analysis by enumerating the perfect matchings in each
of the eight states that mandate two-to-one nesting. For several of these states, it would
be computationally infeasible to construct the complete set of matchings because it is
prohibitively large; nonetheless, Appendix E describes how they can be sampled efficiently.
2 Alaska electoral politics
2.1 Partisanship in Alaska
Alaska is an outlier in U.S. political geography for several reasons including its uniquely
wide array of viable minor parties featured in both local and statewide races. For ex-
ample, the state officially recognizes the secessionist Alaskan Independence Party, which
succeeded in electing Wally Hickel as Governor in 1990. In addition, there are nine orga-
nized “political groups” that are seeking official recognition, and meanwhile are entitled to
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run candidates for statewide office: the Libertarian, Constitution, Progressive, Moderate,
Green, and Veterans Parties, together with the more fringe OWL Party, Patriot’s Party,
and UCES Clowns Party.4
The current Governor of Alaska is Republican Mike Dunleavy, whose predecessor Bill
Walker won as an Independent in 2014, becoming the only sitting U.S. Governor not from
one of the two major parties at the time. (Walker had previously left the Republican Party
and then successfully ran as an Independent candidate, with a Democratic candidate for
Lieutenant Governor.) In 2014, Alaska had the first U.S. Senator in more than 50 years to
win election as a write-in candidate, Senator Lisa Murkowski.
Figure 3: Trump share of major-party Presidential vote per precinct, sized by number of
votes cast.
Alaska is also unique in its geographic distribution of the major parties’ strengths. Un-
like the contiguous United States, where urban areas tend to be most reliably Democratic,
Alaska has Democratic strength in the rural areas to the north and west of the state. These
areas are the homes of significant numbers of Native Alaskan residents, who constitutes
the largest minority in the state. Conversely, the Republican vote is often stronget in sub-
urban areas. In fact, even the city of Anchorage—by far the most populous in the state
with 291,826 out of Alaska’s 710,231 residents in Census 2010—votes Republican overall
in recent presidential races, making it a rare city of its size to do so.5
Although it is one of the “reddest” states in national terms, the Republican-Democratic
split is not the fundamental divide in Alaskan politics. Extremely conservative Republicans
4See http://www.elections.alaska.gov/Core/politicalgroups.php.
5In the 2016 Presidential race, Trump’s share of the major party vote was 58.4% statewide and 53.1%
in Anchorage. The trend holds up across elections in the last cycle, with Republican performance in
Anchorage trailing statewide levels by only about four points.
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are sometimes balanced by a tenuous coalition of moderate Republicans, Democrats, and
Independents, which currently aligns to give net Democratic control in the state House. In
2018, an Independent, Libertarian, or Nonpartisan candidate ran in nine of the 40 House
districts; an Independent won in one district and one Democratic candidate changed his
affiliation to undeclared after winning [4]. In areas where the Democratic party label is
an obstacle to election, running as an Independent can be a successful political strategy.
The majority caucus in the House originally consisted of 25 members: all 15 Democrats,
the two unaffiliated members, and eight Republicans [4].6 On the other hand, one state
Senator elected as a Democrat caucuses with the Republican majority in that body [2].
2.2 Racial demographics and the Voting Rights Act
The 2010 Census reports Alaska’s racial demographics as roughly 6% Hispanic, with non-
Hispanic population comprising 63% White, 3.5% Black, 5.5% Asian, and 15% Alaska
Native or other Native American as shares of the total. An additional 9% of residents are
recorded as belonging to other races, or to two or more races. Figure 4 shows the proportion
of Alaska Native or other Native American residents across the state.
Figure 4: Proportion of Alaska Native or other Native American residents across Alaska.
The color scale is in equal intervals of 20%; the darkest shade marks precincts that are
80-100% Native.
The large Alaska Native population has long been singled out for federal protection
under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, specifically Section 5 of the VRA, which required
6Twenty-one members (15 Democratic, 4 Republican, and two unaffiliated) voted together to elect the
current Speaker (who ran for his House seat as a Democrat but became unaffiliated just days before being
elected Speaker). Four more Republicans joined to establish the majority caucus. In May 2019, however,
one Republican left the House majority coalition [4, 3].
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covered jurisdictions to seek prior federal approval (or “preclearance”) for any changes to
districts or other voting laws. Alaska’s inclusion owed to a long history of discriminatory
“literacy tests”—in this case, English-language tests used to deny voting eligibility to Native
residents—making Alaska one of only nine states covered in full by the special protections
[35].7 Though the Supreme Court ended the practice of preclearance with Shelby v. Holder
(2013), all states are still bound by the VRA requirement to afford minority groups the
ability to elect a candidate of their choice where possible.8 Issues of fair representation and
ballot access for the rural Native population are still highly active in Alaska [10].
2.3 Redistricting rules and practices
Following a 1998 state constitutional amendment, a five-member Alaska Redistricting
Board was formed to draw new district lines after each decennial census [16]. The House
speaker, Senate president, and Chief Justice of the state Supreme Court each choose one
member of the board, and the Governor chooses two. At least three members of the board
must approve a redistricting plan for it to be adopted. The board must draw maps in accor-
dance with the state Constitution, which requires that House districts be “contiguous and
compact territory containing as nearly as practicable a relatively integrated socio-economic
area.... [and] contain[ing] a population as near as practicable to the quotient obtained by
dividing the population of the state by forty” while Senate districts are simply “...composed
as near as practicable of two contiguous house districts” without further constraints [32].9
Balancing the requirements of the VRA and the guidelines of the state Constitution—
compactness in particular—means that Alaska’s House and Senate districts have to be
drawn in a coordinated fashion in most of the state. However, Alaska’s relatively ur-
ban centers of Anchorage and Fairbanks are both predominantly white and made up of
small, regular pieces. This homogeneity of demographics and geography provides addi-
7Since 1971, the indigenous people of Alaska are organized into thirteen regional Tribal Corporations
to administer land and finances. The current legal landscape gives the corporations substantial financial
clout, which does not translate to commensurate political representation for the broader Native Alaskan
population.
8State courts have established that Alaska redistricters must consider the state’s constitutional require-
ments for districts before considering the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. Alaska’s courts have
enforced this hierarchy several times, including most recently in a 2012 ruling that invalidated the maps
used in that year’s elections [25].
9As far as we are aware, the socio-economic clause has never been operationalized or enforced.
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tional flexibility in these regions for the map drawer to construct House districts first,
without considering potential Senate pairings.
Allegations of partisan intent have frequently been leveled at the redistricting process
in Alaska. The maps drawn after the 2000 Census were accused of being a Democratic
gerrymander, while Democrats have called the post-2010 maps (drawn by a board with a
4-1 Republican majority) a Republican gerrymander [25]. The fact that a Democratic-led
caucus controls the House while Republicans have 2/3 control of the Senate lends credence
to the possibility that not the House districts themselves, but their pairing to form Senate
districts, is chosen for Republican advantage. That possibility is investigated below.
2.4 Our choice of election data
In Alaska, three types of races occur statewide. The entire state votes for a Governor and
Lieutenant Governor, elected on a single ticket, every four years; they elect one member
to the U.S. House of Representatives every two years; and they elect a U.S. Senator for a
term of 6 years in the Class 2 and Class 3 cycles.
We consider only those elections which occurred after the implementation of new maps
in July 2013. (A map approved for temporary use in 2012 was replaced after litigation.)
Seven statewide races occurred in this time period:
Gov14 Walker (I/D) [48.10%] Parnell (R) [45.88%]
Cong14 Young (R) [50.97%] Dunbar (D) [40.97%]
McDermott (L) [7.61%]
Sen14 Sullivan (R) [47.96%] Begich (D) [45.83%]
Cong16 Young (R) [50.32%] Lindbeck (D) [36.02%]
McDermott (L) [10.31%]
Sen16 Murkowski (R) [44.36%] Miller (L) [29.16%]
Stock (I) [13.23%]
Metcalfe (D) [11.62%]
Cong18 Young (R) [53.08%] Galvin (D) [46.50%]
Gov18 Dunleavy (R) [51.44%] Begich (D) [44.41%]
The list includes all candidates with at least 5% of the vote in any race.10
We will use the Cong18 and Gov18 races as the fundamental electoral data for the
10Walker ran for Gov14 as an Independent, but with a Democratic running mate. In Gov18, Walker
dropped out and ultimately received just 2% of the vote.
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Gov18-N party share Gov18-A party share
Cong18-N party share Cong18-A party share
Figure 5: These choropleth images show that party preferences in the Governor race are
spatialized very differently from the U.S. House race, even though the statewide party
share is nearly identical. On the other hand, there is little visible change with and without
including absentee ballots (marked with A and N, respectively), though this does have a
significant bottom-line partisan impact.
analysis below. These two contests feature a Democratic and Republican candidate without
major third-party presence and are interesting because they have very different spatial
patterns of party support but similar bottom-line partisan shares. The two-party vote
share for the Democrat in those races was 46.7% for Alyse Galvin against Don Young for
Congress and 46.3% for Mark Begich against Mike Dunleavy for Governor.11
Alaskan elections receive a high proportion of ballots not reported through individual
precincts. These unprecincted ballots include absentee, provisional, and early votes, which
are all reported by legislative House district. For federal races such as the U.S. House, a
small number of overseas military ballots are also reported on a statewide basis. In the 2018
U.S. House race, 33.36% of reported ballots were unprecincted. In the 2018 Governor race,
11We note that the question of preferring endogenous or exogenous election data for redistricting analysis
is a live one in political science, as reflected for instance in the article, rejoinder, and response between
Best et al and McGhee in the March 2018 issue of the Election Law Journal [7, 26, 6]. Our research
group inclines to the use of well-chosen exogenous (statewide) election data in general, but we further note
that using endogenous data would be forbidding in the Alaska legislature. Besides a significant number
of uncontested races, these legislative races also feature a proliferation of minor parties (described above),
making a regression analysis particularly inadequate to cleanly model voters’ preferences between the two
major parties.
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34.18% of ballots were unprecincted. (For ease of reference, we will call all unprecincted
ballots “absentee” below.) We report results for each election both including and excluding
the absentee ballots. Thus our four election treatments can be labeled Gov18-N, Gov18-A,
Cong18-N, and Cong18-A, where the N versions drop absentee ballots from the tally and
the A versions include them. In §5, we need to know the precinct location of the votes; for
this, we assign absentee ballots to precincts in numbers proportional to precinct population.
Table 1 shows clearly that absentee ballots collectively favor Democrats by roughly two
percentage points per House district. Only districts 37 and 38 have a Republican lean in
the absentee ballots in either election.
Table 1: This table shows how the currently enacted House and Senate districts fall with
respect to the voting patterns from our two selected elections. The individual rows corre-
spond to the 40 numbered state House districts, paired into the 20 state Senate districts
labeled A-T. The highlighting in the votes columns shows which party received the majority
of the two-way vote share in the corresponding Senate district.
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3 Data and methods
All experiments in this paper were performed on an Ubuntu 16.04 machine with 64 GB
memory and an Intel Xeon Gold 6136 CPU (3.00GHz). Algorithmic descriptions of the
FKT method for enumerating matchings and the Prune-and-Choose method for generating
matchings are given in Appendix B and C of the Supplementary Material, respectively.
3.1 Election results, shapefiles, and dual graphs
Election data were gathered from the Alaska elections website [1] and demographic data
were obtained from the 2010 Census. Absentee and early voting information was only
available by House district, so precinct-level data was assigned by prorating by population.
We prepared the geospatial data with the MGGG Preprocessing Suite, which uses areal
interpolation for blocks not fully contained in precincts [30]. The cleaned and processed
version of the data is available on GitHub [28].
In the 2010 Census, Alaska had 45,292 census blocks, of which over a third (18,263)
are water-only. Alaska has 441 precincts, ranging in population from a minimum of 44
people (Pedro Bay) to 7994 people (JBER1, in Anchorage) [1]. Six precincts have over
5000 people, and sixteen have under 100.
Beginning with a shapefile of the geography, in this instance precincts, we use geospatial
libraries in Python to create a dual graph in GerryChain whose nodes are the geographic
units, and where two units are connected by an edge if their units share a positive-length
boundary in the shapefile [27]. We then adjust edges to better correspond to plausible
notions of adjacency, especially when water is involved, as described below.
Water adjacency
For areas connected only by water, a decision must be made about whether to count
them as adjacent. To illustrate the impact of this seemingly minor issue, we construct
three different dual graphs of the precinct map, which we call the tight, restricted, and the
permissive graphs.
Permissive adjacency is the closest match to the AK Division of Elections precinct
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shapefile. The dual graph of those precincts is nearly connected using this approach,
except for one gap in the Kodiak archipelago and five additional island precincts of the
West coast. We manually added all visually reasonable connections in these cases. Among
the 441 precincts, this process produces 1151 edges. Aggregating the precincts into the 40
current House districts produces a House district dual graph with 100 edges.
Figure 6: The Cook Inlet is a body of water stretching up from the Gulf of Alaska; its Knik
Arm and Turnagain Arm surround the densest part of Anchorage, separating it from rural
precincts to the north and south. Following precinct adjacencies provided by the state
would allow districts to jump across the water, while a more restrictive notion of adjacency
would not. On the right, we see that the precinct shapefile gives no guidance on how the
islands are allowed to be connected to the mainland by districts.
To construct our more restricted notion of adjacency, we consulted the Census Bureau
Cartographic Boundary shapefile, which is clipped to land, i.e., excludes water from its
geographic units. With this as a guide, we removed certain connections across water (see
Figure 6). This reduces the number of edges modestly, from 1151 to 1109 for the precinct
dual graph and from 100 to 92 for the House dual graph.
Finally, we create the tightest version of the graph by using the current House map as
a guide, keeping the fewest water adjacencies that would allow the current districts to be
considered valid. This gives us a tight dual graph with 1105 precinct edges and 89 House
edges. As we will see below, these small changes to the underlying dual graph can have
large consequences for the number of possible matchings. Figure 7 shows the resulting
graphs, which we use in the remainder of the analysis.
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Alaska House
Districts
Tight
(89 edges)
Restricted
(92 edges)
Permissive
(100 edges)
Figure 7: The three Alaska dual graphs.
3.2 Markov chains for generating alternative House plans
Markov chain Monte Carlo, or MCMC, is the leading method in scientific computing for
searching large spaces and studying properties of complex systems. Numerous research
groups now use MCMC implementations to study the universe of possible districting plans,
once the basic units have been set [5, 11, 13]. We use the open-source software package
GerryChain, created by the Voting Rights Data Institute [27].
This algorithm generates new plans iteratively, making modifications to the districting
assignments of some of the units at each step. To choose how to modify districts at random,
we use a proposal called Recombination (ReCom), introduced in [13].12 At each step, this
proposal merges the units of two adjacent districts and then uses a balanced cut of a
spanning tree to generate a new division of the merged districts. The user can elect to
impose hard constraints in the form of requirements for plans, or can choose a weighted
random walk that preferentially selects plans with properties deemed to better comport
with the districting principles. The tree method itself promotes the selection of compact
districts, so the plans generated in this way tend to have comparable compactness statistics
to human-approved plans and to comfortably pass the “eyeball test” for district shape.
We ran our Markov chains on Alaska’s 441 precincts as basic units, seeking new legally
valid plans for forming them into 40 House districts. As outlined above in §2.3, the law re-
quires that the districters aim to produce equipopulous, compact, and contiguous districts.
The ideal population of a House district is 710,231/40, or between 17,755 and 17,756
12The scientific advantage of using Markov chains to sample districting plans is that they have a theo-
retical guarantee of producing representative samples (with respect to their stationary disributions) if run
for long enough. In our case, we run the chains until we obtain strong heuristic evidence of mixing, which
is a common and effective standard in scientific computing. See [13].
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people. By federal law and common practice, legislative districts can deviate by up to
5% from ideal size without a special reason, so we have imposed that limit on population
balance, allowing 16,868–18,643 people per district. The same level of population balance
was imposed on the Senate ensembles.
We generated ensembles of 100,000 distinct House and Senate districting plans, varying
the definitions of contiguity (tight/restricted/permissive). A district-level dual graph of the
sampled plan was pulled every step. Using FKT, we counted the number of matchings for
each districting plan and edges between House districts, and we stored plans with extreme
matching statistics. The goal was to learn whether the new plans could have markedly
different partisan outcomes, either on their own or when matched to form a Senate plan,
from the current districts.
Replication code for producing and analyzing these ensembles is available on GitHub
[29].
4 Alternative matchings in current House plan
In this section, we evaluate the currently enacted House plan by generating all of the
potential matchings and computing their partisan behavior under our chosen election data.
We start by computing the number of matchings for each of our notions of adjacency,
reported in Table 2, using the FKT algorithm described in Appendix B. This already
highlights the fact that toggling a small number of edges in the Alaska House dual graph
(due only to reasonable interpretations of water adjacency) can change the number of
perfect matchings very substantially; in this case, the number of matchings jumps by
nearly a factor of eight.13
We then use the prune-and-choose algorithm described in Appendix C to generate each
of the possible pairings. For each matching, we evaluate its performance under each of
the four election treatments, comparing the number of Senate districts with a Democratic
majority in the actual plan to the average number over the Senate plans formed by all
possible matchings. It bears emphasizing that the Democratic seats reported across the
13It is worth emphasizing that the number of matchings is sensitively dependent on the precise edge
structure as well as simply the number of edges. This fact is explored below in §5.3.
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Alaska Tight Restricted Permissive
Dual edges 89 92 100
Matchings 14,446 29,289 108,765
FKT runtime 0.022 sec 0.022 sec 0.027 sec
Prune–and–choose runtime 14.2 sec 28.5 sec 105.1 sec
Table 2: On Alaska, FKT (which only counts matchings) runs in a fraction of a second;
the prune-and-choose algorithm (which stores matchings) runs in under two minutes.
table refers to the number of Senate districts in which Galvin votes outnumbered Young
votes for Congress, or Begich votes outnumbered Dunleavy votes for Governor.
D Senate districts
Enacted Tight Restricted Permissive
Cong18-N 6 6.90 6.78 6.52
Cong18-A 7 8.30 8.18 7.93
Gov18-N 7 7.69 7.57 7.33
Gov18-A 7 8.24 8.13 7.88
Competitive districts
Enacted Tight Restricted Permissive
Cong18-N 13 12.12 11.90 11.91
Cong18-A 12 12.33 12.26 12.54
Gov18-N 11 10.54 10.55 10.21
Gov18-A 10 9.78 9.68 9.68
Table 3: Partisan outcome and competitiveness in the current (Enacted) Senate plan com-
pared to the average over alternative matchings. A competitive district is defined here
as one with a D share between 40 and 60 percent. Here, every partisan outcome is more
favorable to Republicans than the neutral expectation. Compare Table 4, which varies the
underlying House plan and shows the opposite partisan tendency.
Comparing the enacted plan against all possible pairings does indeed find a small Re-
publican tilt, falling approximately one seat to the Republican side of the typical matching
but certainly does not appear to be a significant outlier.14 (At the same time, we can
observe the substantial effect of discarding absentee ballots: it shifts outcomes towards
Republicans by about 1 seat.) The histograms in Figure 8 add detail by showing the full
distribution of Democratic seats with respect to each race.
14The actual Senate composition also has six or seven Democrats, depending on how you count: seven
state Senators were elected as Democrats, but Sen. Lyman Hoffman caucuses with the Republican majority.
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Cong18-A D Senate seats Gov18-A D Senate seats
Figure 8: The number of Senate districts with a D majority, as the matching varies across
the permissive set. The green line marks the average number of Democratic seats over
all matchings and the red line shows the outcome in the current plan, showing a one-seat
advantage for Republicans in the current matching and a four- to five-seat swing overall.
These two histograms look nearly identical for the different elections, despite the substantial
differences in how the vote was distributed.
For even more granular detail, at the level of individual districts, we can study box-and-
whisker plots (Figure 9). In these images, the districts are ordered from lowest to highest
Democratic vote share in order to make them comparable over the ensembles. The boxes
show the 25th-75th percentile range and the whiskers show every result achieved over the
full set of (permissive) matchings. Similar histograms and boxplots for the remainder of
the elections and dual graphs are available in our supplemental material [29].
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Cong18-A Dem share by Senate district
Gov18-A Dem share by Senate district
Figure 9: Democratic vote share in current Senate districts (red dots), compared to range
in comparable districts over the full set of matchings (box and whiskers). With district-by-
district detail, the differences between the two elections’ voting patterns are more visible.
For instance, the 13th-indexed districts in the state have a Galvin (Congressional) share
and a Begich (Governor) share just under the median of the respective ensembles, while
nearly 75% of the ensemble in each case had a Democratic majority in the corresponding
district. Where boxes have degenerated to a single value, it is because some matchings are
forced, thinning the number of possibilities.
5 Alternative House and Senate districts
5.1 Partisan outcomes
Using the Markov chain ensembles of 100,000 plans each as a neutral counterfactual for
drawing districts, we first report the number of House districts out of 40 with more Demo-
cratic than Republican votes.
Beyond the averages, we can view the full histograms to gauge the extent to which the
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D House districts
Enacted Tight Restricted Permissive
Cong18-N 15 14.10 13.93 14.28
Cong18-A 18 16.35 16.33 16.73
Gov18-N 15 14.73 14.55 14.44
Gov18-A 20 17.86 17.63 17.65
Competitive districts
Enacted Tight Restricted Permissive
Cong18-N 24 25.51 25.01 25.23
Cong18-A 24 24.85 24.62 24.88
Gov18-N 19 21.03 20.60 20.59
Gov18-A 19 20.83 20.57 20.52
Table 4: The number of House districts with a D majority and the number of competitive
districts, as the House plan varies. A competitive district is defined as one in which the D
share is between 40 and 60 percent. Compare Table 3.
current plan is an outlier.
Cong18-A D House seats Gov18-A D House seats
Figure 10: The number of districts with a D majority in the indicated election, over the
ensemble of (permissive) House plans.
Recall that the current majority House caucus includes 24 members: 16 members who
were elected as Democrats, seven members who were elected as Republicans, and one who
was elected as an Independent.
The Senate ensemble gives another interesting vantage point. With respect to both vote
patterns, the bulk of plans assembled by the Markov chain process have 7-10 Democratic
Senate seats, and the full range observed in the ensemble is 6-11. Compare this to simply
matching the current House plan, where we can fully exhaust the possibilities instead of
sampling. Matchings give us Democratic seat outcomes of 6-10 in either vote pattern, with
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Cong18-A D Senate seats Gov18-A D Senate seats
Figure 11: The number of districts with a D majority in the indicated election, over the
ensemble of (permissive) Senate plans.
a small number that achieve a 5-seat outcome against the Governor returns. This means
that mere control over the matchings gives essentially just as much partisan latitude as the
right to draw plans from scratch with the most permissive notion of precinct adjacency.
5.2 Native population
We also find that the number of districts with an Alaska Native population majority is
typically 3-4 in our randomly produced House plans, compared to three in the current
House plan. Furthermore, the ability to form districts more permissively across water
makes a very noticeable difference, boosting the likelihood of forming a fourth majority-
Native district by random selection.
Number of majority-Native House districts 2 3 4
Permissive ensemble 444 53,596 45,960
Restricted ensemble 1,053 97,069 1,878
Tight ensemble 1,135 97,507 1,358
5.3 Re-matching the new plans
Over each ensemble of 100,000 House plans, we computed the number of dual edges and the
number of perfect matchings. The (nonzero) numbers of matchings varied from 74–165,344
(tight), 42–194,588 (restricted), and 852–961,176 (permissive). To a first approximation,
more edges means more matchings, but the scatterplots in Figure 12 show that there is
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also substantial dependence on the specific placement of the edges.15
Figure 12: The relationship between the number of edges (x axis) and the number of
matchings (y axis). Each point is a House plan, varying over the tight (top left), restricted
(lower left), and permissive (right) ensembles.
To illustrate the sensitive dependence of the number of matchings on the precise topol-
ogy of the graph, we focus on three examples found in the permissive House ensembles in
Figure 13. The leftmost dual graph has 103 edges and 961,176 matchings while the next one
has more edges but less than half the number of matchings. The disparity in these match-
ing counts is almost entirely due to the fact that there are two ways to pair the districts in
the “panhandle” of the 103-edge graph—[(29,30), (39,40)] or [(29,39), (30,40)]—compared
to the unique pairing [(17,40), (35,36)] in the corresponding region of the 105-edge graph.
This accounts for a doubling in the number of overall matchings, assuming a comparable
number of ways to match the remaining 36 vertices. Forced pairings play an important role
15One notable feature of Fig 12 is the prevalence of plans with low numbers of matchings. It is easy to
construct graphs with any number of edges and zero matchings, simply by having any two leaves (vertices
of degree one) connected to a single common neighbor—and this can easily occur by chance. There were
no matchings at all in 2319, 4274, and 3504 of the dual graphs found by the ensembles, respectively. It is
similarly easy to randomly construct graphs with very few matchings simply by having many leaves and
thus many forced edges. On the other hand, there are graphs with 2n vertices, roughly n2/2 edges, and
only a single matching: start with a complete graph on n vertices (i.e., with all edges present) and add a
single leaf connected to each of those. Each leaf vertex is forced to match to its unique neighbor, leaving
no more vertices to pair.
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in plans with few matchings. The rightmost graph shows an example with 101 edges but
only 852 matchings, the lowest nonzero number ever observed. This is due to the many
forced pairs—[(11,13), (12,34), (2,3), (1,36), (4,33), (8,24), (7,26), (17,25)]—which limits
the flexibility in pairing the remaining vertices.
103 edges
961,176 matchings (most)
105 edges (most)
436,220 matchings
101 edges
852 matchings (fewest)
Violin plot scale
Figure 13: A selection of three House plans from our ensembles whose dual graphs have
various extremal properties. The violin plot shows the number of Democratic districts
with respect to Gov18-A vote data, and the colored regions show the relative sizes of the
matching sets.
The analysis demonstrates that the matchability of the underlying House plan can have
a significant downstream partisan impact on the Senate plans that can be formed. Figure
13 shows examples of this behavior by comparing the distributions over the possible perfect
matchings for three plans from the permissive ensemble. For each of the three House plans,
a typical perfect matching has 5-8 Democratic districts out of 20. However, by choosing a
House plan with more district adjacencies or more matchings, it is possible to get as few as
3 or as many as 12. Investigating the full flexibility allowed to a mapmaker who controls
the House district drawing process is an interesting question for further research.
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6 Conclusions
Numerous studies have sought to quantify the partisan advantage secured by the selection
of a particular districting plan. In that vein, we find that the current Alaska House plan
favors Democrats by an estimated 1-2 seats out of 40 when compared to other (contiguous,
compact, population-balanced) ways of forming districts from precincts. The core of the
paper, however, is a novel application of rigorous mathematics to redistricting in the case of
a nesting rule for state legislatures. For that, we can apply the theory of perfect matchings
of graphs, learning that the Alaska Senate plan secures a Republican advantage of 1 seat
out of 20 when compared to other ways to match the House districts. Other findings:
• The choice of matching of a fixed House plan gives as much latitude to control partisan
outcomes as drawing a Senate plan from scratch: approximately a five-seat swing out
of 20.
• The significant number of absentee/early/provisional ballots in Alaska skew markedly
Democratic. Different choices of how to assign them to precincts will impact findings
about the consequences of moving district boundaries, and should be further studied.
However, this has no effect on our analysis of matchings.
• Well-chosen statewide races, in this case the 2018 Governor and Congressional elec-
tions, gave partisan measurements that are closely compatible with each other and
qualitatively concordant with the Legislative outcomes.
• Contiguity rules are not completely straightforward, and can have a major role in
shaping the space of districting possibilities. For instance, permissive water adjacency
makes nearly half of neutrally generated House plans have a fourth majority-Native
district, while less than 2% of plans do with more restricted adjacency (§5.2).
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Supplement to Mathematics of Nested
Districts: The Case of Alaska
This supplement contains additional plots and technical descriptions of the algorithms
used in the paper for enumerating and sampling perfect matchings. Appendix A shows
reference figures of the state House dual graphs for the non-Alaska states with strict nest-
ing rules. Further information about the FKT algorithm is given in Appendix B while
Appendix C introduces the new Prune–and–Choose algorithm and provides a proof of cor-
rectness. In Appendix D, these algorithms are applied to all states with a nesting rule to
compare the relative scales of the enumeration problem. Finally, in Appendix E we imple-
ment and validate a uniform sampling procedure for matchings that can be applied even
in the states where generating all of the matchings would be computationally infeasible.
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A Dual Graphs of States with Nesting Rules
In this appendix we show the dual graphs for the other states that require two-to-one
nesting. Corresponding plots for Alaska are shown in Figure 7 of the main text. The left-
hand column shows the House districts, with the dual graph overlaid, and the right-hand
column shows a nearly-planar embedding with accurate district labels. Given these House
districts, valid Senate plans in these states correspond to perfect matchings of these graphs.
Illinois
Iowa
Minnesota
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Montana
Nevada
Oregon
Wyoming
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B FKT algorithm for enumerating perfect matchings
As described in Section 1.2 of the main text, Fisher, Kasteleyn, and Temperley designed
a method now known as the FKT algorithm for enumerating the perfect matchings of a
planar graph. This allows us to quickly determine the number of perfect matchings in a
dual graph, allowing us to evaluate whether it is computationally tractable to explicitly list
all matchings. FKT takes a planar embedding of a graph G as input, then assigns signs to
the edges in what is called a Pfaffian orientation (every face should have an odd number
of counterclockwise edges) to create a signed, skew-symmetric adjacency matrix A. Then
√
detA counts the perfect matchings.16
This algorithm runs in fractions of a second on each graph, which is fast enough to
incorporate at each step of a Markov chain. Our implementation is freely available at [29],
and timing details are provided in §D.
C Prune-and-choose algorithm for constructing per-
fect matchings
In order to evaluate the partisan properties of the pairings of House districts, it is not suf-
ficient to count matchings; we also need to generate and examine the full list of matchings.
In this section, we describe a simple method to create a list of all possible perfect matchings
of a graph. This is a recursive method that simplifies the search by looking for forced pairs.
The first step is to prune the graph. This means finding all leaves of the graph (nodes of
degree one, i.e., House districts that are only connected to one other district) and matching
each with its only neighbor. We call these matches forced pairs. One round of pruning may
create new nodes of degree one in the resulting graph, and so we iteratively prune forced
pairs until there are no nodes of degree one left.
The second step is a simple check to rule out a parity obstruction to the existence of
a matching. If any connected component has an odd number of nodes, then it cannot be
perfectly matched, so the whole graph also fails to have a perfect matching. If all connected
16The Pfaffian is a general matrix operation that agrees with
√
detA for skew-symmetric matrices. See
[23] for more mathematical details.
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components have even numbers of nodes, then we proceed.
Next is a choice step. From the remaining graph, we choose a node of minimum degree,
then consider pairing it with each of its neighbors. For each of those pairings, we remove
both nodes from the graph and apply our algorithm to what remains. We prune, check,
choose, and iterate, in sequence, until the process terminates at a connected graph of two
nodes, producing a perfect matching of the original graph. We provide a proof of correctness
in Appendix C.2 and an example run of the algorithm on a small graph below.
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C.1 Prune-and-Choose Example
A run of our algorithm on a sample graph with ten nodes proceeds as follows.
Initiate.
J
IHG
F
ED
C
B
A
A has degree one, so we record
AB as a forced pair. Remove
A,B from the graph. Test for
parity. There is one remaining
component with eight nodes,
so we pass the parity check.
J
IHG
F
ED
C
B
A
C is lowest-indexed node of de-
gree 2, so try to pair with E.
However, one complementary
component (FIJ) has an odd
number of nodes, so we aban-
don this branch of the decision
tree.
J
IHG
F
ED
C
B
A
Pairing C instead with F and
removing both from the graph
forces the IJ pairing.
J
IHG
F
ED
C
B
A
Now E is the lowest-indexed
node of minimal degree. By
pairing ED, the next forced
pairing completes the match-
ing. Similarly for EH.
J
IHG
F
ED
C
B
A
J
IHG
F
ED
C
B
A
In the end, we find the two perfect matchingsAB/CF/IJ/ED/GH andAB/CF/IJ/EH/GD.
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C.2 Prune-and-choose algorithm validity
In this section we formally describe the prune-and-choose method and provide a proof
of correctness. Pseudo-code for the algorithm is given here and our implementation in
Python is available at [29]. We introduce some additional notation to describe the method.
The subgraph of G induced by deleting nodes u and v will be denoted G \ {u, v}. We will
represent a matching as a set of edges M = {(u1, v1), (u2, v2), . . . , (u`, v`)}. We assume that
the vertices of G are ordered in order to provide a deterministic algorithm. To generate
the full set of matchings for a graph G, we would call FindMatchings(G, ∅).
Algorithm 1 Pseudo-code for Prune-and-Choose Algorithm to Find All Perfect Matchings
in a Graph G
1: procedure FindMatchings(G,M) . Input a graph G and the current set of
matched edges M
2: if G is connected and has exactly two vertices u, v then
3: return G \ {u, v}, M ∪ (u, v)
4: else if G has any vertex with exactly one neighbor then
5: prune: let u be the first degree-one vertex; let v be its neighbor
6: return FindMatchings(G \ {u, v},M ∪ (u, v)) . Pair forced vertices and
recurse.
7: else if G contains a component with an odd number of vertices then
8: break . There are no perfect matchings in G
9: else
10: let u be first vertex with a minimum number of neighbors v1, ..., vk
11: for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, let Gi = G \ {u, vi} and Mi = M ∪ (u, vi)
12: return
⋃k
i=1FindMatchings(Gi, Mi) . Recurse to find all perfect matchings
with each pair
We next show that the algorithm returns the correct set of perfect matchings on any
graph. They key idea of the algorithm and the proof is that for any edge of the graph, the
set of perfect matchings that contain edge (u, v) can be computed by finding all perfect
matchings in the subgraph G \ {u, v}. This is an example of the self–reducible nature of
the perfect matching problem which is discussed in more detail below.
Theorem 1. The prune-and-choose algorithm correctly finds all perfect matchings in the
input graph.
Proof. We consider any graph G with n = 2k vertices and proceed by induction on k.
When k = 1, G is either connected (in which case the algorithm correctly finds the unique
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perfect matching at lines 2-3) or has two isolated vertices and no perfect matchings (which
the algorithm correctly reports in lines 7-8).
For k > 1 the algorithm proceeds according to exactly one of the following three cases:
1. If G contains a leaf u with neighbor v, then u must be matched to v in any perfect
matching. Line 6 then calls FindMatchings on G\{u, v} which returns the correct
set of matchings of G \ {u, v}, by our inductive hypothesis. Adding (u, v) to each
matching returned by this function gives the full set of matchings for G.
2. If G contains no leaves and some connected component of G has an odd number
of vertices, then there are no perfect matchings in G and the algorithm correctly
terminates at lines 7-8.
3. If G contains no leaves and each connected component of G has an even number of
vertices, then there exists a vertex of minimal index u which has a minimum number
of neighbors. Since G has no leaves and no odd components, u has degree at least 2.
In any perfect matching, it must be matched to one of its neighbors v1, ..., vk. The
algorithm considers each possibility calling FindMatchings on G \ {u, vi} which
returns the correct set of matchings by our inductive hypothesis. As in step 1, adding
(u, vi) to the matchings returned on G \ {u, vi} provides a complete set of matchings
for G.
Thus for any graph G, the first pass through the algorithm either returns ∅, which only
occurs if G has no perfect matchings, or it calls the algorithm recursively on a graph of
size 2(k − 1). These recursive calls satisfy our inductive hypothesis and hence we obtain
the complete set of matchings for G.
We note that well-known classes of planar graphs have exponentially many perfect
matchings. For example, this is true of the n × n grids [8, 18, 34]. This trivially implies
that there is no polynomial-time algorithm to list them all as output. As we discuss
in Appendix D, the dual graphs of real-world districting plans often have more perfect
matchings than a grid graph of comparable size. In that section we also provide timing
results for our algorithm that demonstrate that it is adequately fast for several problems
at realistic scale, but not all. In Appendix E below we show how a sampling approach
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can be employed to those settings in which listing all perfect matchings is computationally
infeasible.
D Enumerating matchings
Here we apply FKT and Prune-and-Choose to compute the number of potential matchings
for each of the eight states that require Senate districts to be formed from adjacent pairs
of House districts. We use the standard Census shapefiles to generate dual graphs for each
state, making them parallel to the permissive graph for Alaska. Visualizations of these
dual graphs are shown in Appendix A.
Alaska Illinois Iowa Minnesota
House districts 40 118 100 134
Dual edges 100 326 251 260
Matchings 108,765 9,380,573,911 1,494,354,140,511 6,156,723,718,225,577,984
FKT runtime 0.027 sec 0.39 sec 0.21 sec 0.53 sec
Montana Nevada Oregon Wyoming
House districts 100 42 60 60
Dual edges 269 111 158 143
Matchings 11,629,786,967,358 313,698 229,968,613 920,864
FKT runtime 0.24 sec 0.038 sec 0.079 sec 0.056 sec
Table 5: Number of matchings possible with respect to the current House plan for each
state (with dual graphs generated from census shapefiles) and timings for computing them
with FKT.
Alaska’s 108,765 (permissive) matchings are the fewest among the eight states. This is
partially due to the fact that Alaska has fewer House districts than the other states, and
partly due to lower edge density and several forced matchings.17 The number of matchings
varies greatly across the other states, with Minnesota having the most at 6.1 × 1018, over
six quintillion. By contrast, the number of matchings in a 10 × 10 grid with 100 nodes
is 258,584,046,368 (fewer than Iowa, which has 100 House districts) and a 12 × 12 grid
with 144 nodes has 53,060,477,521,960,000 (fewer than Minnesota, which has 134 House
districts). To understand why the states’ matching numbers exceed those of comparably
17The four districts in the Southeast corner of the state must be paired (33–34 and 35–36), further
restricting the possible matchings.
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sized grids, consider the impact of just a few extra edges. Adding just four edges to the
10 × 10 grid—a single diagonal edge from each of the four corner vertices to its diagonal
neighbor—increases the number of matchings by 745,241,088.
Extrapolating the prune-and-choose timing from Nevada (299 seconds) and Wyoming
(851 seconds) suggests that generating all of the matchings for some of the other states
would take prohibitively long—even with linear scaling, the Wyoming timing suggests that
the Minnesota computation would take some 180 million years. However, it is possible to
sample matchings from planar graphs uniformly, allowing for good estimates of relevant
statistics. We have implemented the technique suggested in [17] for this purpose [29] and
in Appendix E we validate this approach on Alaska.
E Sampling and extremization over matchings
For Minnesota’s 6.1 quintillion matchings, it would be prohibitively inefficient to list them
all, no matter the algorithmic design. On the other hand, we can construct uniform samples
of the full set of matchings by making use of the self-reducible structure in the perfect
matching problem [17] as follows. We can compute the likelihood that a given edge appears
in a perfect matching by deleting the edge from the graph and enumerating the matchings on
the remaining nodes with FKT. The ratio of matchings on the leftover to total matchings
is the probability that the edge is used. With this, we can iterate, starting with the
original graph and adding a single edge to the matching at each step with appropriate
probability. Since FKT runs in polynomial time, so does our sampling procedure, since
a perfect matching requires n
2
edges and finding the probabilities used to select each edge
requires at most
(
n
2
)
FKT evaluations.
We next demonstrate that the uniform sampling method can attain good accuracy with
a reasonably small number of samples, using the case of Alaska where we can compare
to the ground truth from the full matching set. For each of our three dual graphs, we
sample 100 matchings uniformly and compare the resulting statistics to those of the full
set of matchings. Figure 14 shows these comparisons. Although the distributions are not
identical, they are quite similar and the sample means vary only by small fractions of a
seat from the actual values.
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Cong18-A D Senate seats Gov 18-A D Senate seats
abs. error Tight Restricted Permissive
Cong18-A 0.0082 0.0234 0.0868
Gov18-A 0.0203 0.0361 0.0814
Figure 14: Comparison of number of Democratic Senate districts in a uniform sample
of 100 (permissive) matchings to the full collection of matchings. The table shows the
absolute error in the average seats total for this and the other two Alaska dual graphs. The
histograms show more detail, and illustrate how close the averages are with only 1/1000 of
the space being sampled.
This example shows that even a sample of modest size produces a good estimate of the
full distribution. This provides support for our assertion that this procedure can be carried
out successfully on states like Minnesota, where it would be computationally infeasible to
generate all matchings. We note that all materials are available in our code repositories for
others to perform this sampling for the other matching states, but there will be a non-trivial
data setup cost in choosing appropriate election data and cleaning it for the analysis.
Though the histograms above are quite similar, the sample fails to capture the full
range of seat outcomes in the Governor’s race: a small number of possible matchings result
in five D seats, but that is never observed in the sample. A second algorithm may be
employed to provably find the correct range of seats outcomes possible, again without
fully listing the matchings. Finding perfect matchings of extremal weight, given an edge-
weighted graph, is a classic problem in combinatorics, solved for instance with the Blossom
algorithm developed by Edmonds in the 1960s [14, 15]. To apply that in this setting, we
use any given pattern of votes to assign a weight to each edge of our dual graph: an edge
{u, v} linking two House districts u and v is given weight 1 if there are more D than R
votes in the hypothetical Senate district that combines u and v. Otherwise, assign weight
0. The weight of the perfect matching is defined as the sum of the weights of its edges.
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By construction, this is the number of D seats in that matching. For more background on
extremal perfect matchings, see for instance Chapters 25-26 of [31].
As a final note, knowing these extremes also informs the size of a uniform sample nec-
essary to estimate the true distribution to a desired precision. A detailed discussion of the
precise number of samples needed for various estimates is presented in [37]. In particular,
Theorem 5.3 shows that with failure rate δ, taking max
(
4
ε2
,
4 ln( 1
δ
)
ε2
)
samples suffices to es-
timate the probability of each individual outcome to within ε (i.e., an L∞ bound) whereas
max
(
4n
ε2
,
8 ln( 1
δ
)
ε2
)
samples suffice to bound the sum of the absolute differences between the
individual estimates and the true probabilities (an L1 bound).
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